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Unconsidered Mitigators and Invalid
Aggravators in the Penalty Phase:
Reconsidering Buchanan v. Angelone
Craig B. Lane*
I Introduction
Buchanan v. Angelone' was a defeat for the Virginia death penalty
defense bar. The Court refused to require either general or specific mitiga-
tion instructions in the penalty phase. But, as is often the trade of those
who make death penalty defense their occupation, this article seeks to glean
useful law from an overall defeat, to make lemonade out of this lemon.
The first part looks at the Court's analysis of the sentencing phase
instruction utilized by the trial court in Buchanan, how it determined that
the rather unclear language sufficed to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and what steps defense counsel might take to deal with same.
The second part explores the validity of eligibility phase aggravators in light
of the Buchanan Court's emphasis on the necessity for channeling and
limiting jury discretion more extensively in this area.
I. Unconsidered Mitigators
On September 15, 1987, Douglas McArthur Buchanan, Jr. killed his
father, step-mother and two half-brothers after arguing with his father over
his natural mother's death of breast cancer.2 Buchanan was convicted of the
capital murder of more than one person as part of the same act or transac-
tion in the Circuit Court of Amherst County.' At the sentencing phase,
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Washington & Lee University School of Law; M.S.,
North Carolina State University; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A
shout out to the fabulous Penny J. White, whose inspirational leadership ultimately led to
this article.
1. 118 S. Ct. 757 (1998).
2. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757, 760-61 (Va. 1989), cert. denied sub
nom. Buchanan v. Virginia, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990).
3. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 759 (1998). For the Virginia Code section
under which Buchanan was convicted in his 1989 trial, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(7)
(Michie 1989).
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Buchanan introduced mitigation evidence regarding his mother's early death
from breast cancer, his father's subsequent remarriage, and his parent's
subsequent attempts to prevent him from visiting his maternal relatives.4 A
psychiatrist also testified that Buchanan was under extreme emotional
disturbance at the time of the crime, largely because of stress induced by the
manner in which Buchanan's family had dealt with and reacted to his
mother's death.'
A. Buchanan's Requested Mitigation Instructions
In the sentencing phase of Buchanan's trial, both the Commonwealth
and Buchanan agreed that the court should use Virginia's pattern capital
sentencing instruction6 to charge the jury. In addition, Buchanan requested
the following four jury instructions on particular mitigating factors: (1) no
significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance; (3) significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law's require-
ments; and (4) his age.' All were denied! Buchanan also proposed a more
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The complete instruction was as follows:
You have convicted the Defendant of an offense which may be punishable by
death. You must decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or
to life i.prisonment.
Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that his conduct in committing the murders of (his fanily]
was outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the above four victims, or to
any one of'them.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding paragraph, then you may fix
the punishment of the Defendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence
that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the
Defendant at life imprisonment.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the require-
ments of the second paragraph in this instruction, then you shall fix the punish-
ment of the Defendant at life imprisonment.
Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 759 n.1 (quoting app. at 73).
7. All four of the requested factors are specifically stated by the Virginia Code to be
facts in mitigation of the offense. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 states in pertinent part:
Facts in mitigation may include, but shall not be limited to, the following: (i) The
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (ii) the capital
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance, (iii) the victim was a participant in the defen-
dant's conduct or consented to the act, (iv) at the time of the commission of the
capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired, (v) the age of the defendant at the timne of the commission ofthe capital
offense or (v i) mental retardation of the defendant.
VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
8. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting app. at 75-76).
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general instruction regarding mitigating evidence, stating that "[i]n addition
to the mitigating factors specified in other instructions, you shall consider
the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background of
[Buchanan] and any other facts in mitigation of the offense."9 This request
too was denied by the court. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
death penalty on the basis of the vileness aggravator"° and the trial court
sentenced Buchanan to death. 1
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Buchanan's petition
for a writ of certiorari from the denial of federal habeas corpus relief by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.12 "This case calls on
us to decide whether the Eighth Amendment requires that a capital jury be
instructed on the concept of mitigating evidence generally, or on particular
statutory mitigating factors. We hold that it does not." 3 So saying, the
majority of the Court 4 in Buchanan's case dismissed the notion that fuller,
clearer explanations to juries of the applicable law in death penalty cases
might assist in the pursuit of justice.
In his argument to the Court alleging it was error for the Fourth
Circuit to deny him habeas corpus relief, Buchanan asserted that "the trial
court violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty when it failed to
provide the jury with express guidance on the concept of mitigation, and to
instruct the jury on particular statutory mitigating factors."' Buchanan's
assertion finds support in Lockett v. Ohio. 6 In Lockett, the Court stated that
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."" Lockett and its
9. Id. (quoting app. at 74).
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
11. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 760. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the conviction and sentence. Buchanan v. Angelone, 384 S.E.2d 757,757 (Va. 1989).
Buchanan subsequently filed a petition for a writ o habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The district court denied the petition and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Buchanan v. Angelone,
103 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996). See also David T. Mdndoe, Case Note, CAP DEF. J., Spring
1997, at 29 (analyzing Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996)); Brian S. Clarke,
Case Note, CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1998, at 4 (analyzing Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757
(1998)).
12. Buchanan v. Angelone, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997).
13. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 758-59.
14. The majority consisted of Rhenquist, C.J., who delivered the opinion, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, J.J. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
15. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 761.
16. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
17. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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progeny explicitly prohibit states from limiting the sentencer's consideration
of any relevant circumstance that could "cause it to decline to impose the
death sentence."18
The majority denied this claim, resting its decision on the dichotomy
between the two phases of the capital sentencing process: the eligibility
phase and the sentencing phase. Quoting from Tuilaepa v. California,19 the
majority stated that the eligibility phase, where "the trier of fact must
convict the defendant of murder and find one 'aggravating circumstance' (or
its equivalent),"" is the phase in regara to which "we have stressed the need
for channeling and limiting the jury's discretion to ensure that the death
penalty is a proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or
capricious in its imposition."
1
Virginia's aggravators22 are eligibility factors of the type referred to in
Tuilaepa. Thus, the Tuilaepa decision's requirement of heightened specific-
ity for eligibility factors applies to Virginia's statutory aggravators.
The majority stated that Buchanan's assertion of the sentencing jury's
need for guidance on the concept of mitigation was misplaced, because
mitigation is the subject of the selection phase, in which "we have empha-
sized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to
allow an individualized determination."23 Therefore, consideration of
mitigating circumstances occurring in the selection phase is to be an open
inquiry, requiring none of the guidance so important in the eligibility phase.
B. Virginia's Penalty Phase Pattern Juty Instruction
At oral argument before the Court, Buchanan asserted for the first time
that the single instruction given was unconstitutionally vague. It follows in
its entirety:
18. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987).
19. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
20. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
21. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73).
22. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 states in pertinent part:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the
prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his
conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery
to the victim.
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
23. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73; Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1994); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304-06 (1987); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983)).
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You have convicted the Defendant of an offense which mar be
punishable by death. You must decide whether the defendant shou d be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct in committing the
murders of [his family] was outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the above four victims, or to any one of them.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding paragraph,
then you may fix the punishment of the Defendant at death or if you
believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the requirements of the second paragraph in this instruction, then you
shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment."'
Justice Breyer's dissent expounded upon Buchanan's vagueness argument
and the majority responded. The majority's approach here was threefold:
first, the instruction did in fact fulfill the requirements of law; second,
Buchanan defaulted the issue; and third, any flaw in the instruction was
cured by the doctrine of context. The latter two ideas will be addressed
first, and then the former.
Buchanan's default on the issue of the instruction's vagueness cannot
be contested. He did not object to the use of the instruction at trial and
never raised it as an issue until oral argument before the Court."
With respect to the context doctrine, the majority cited to Boyde v.
California6 as an exemplary application. The Court stated that in Bu-
chanan, "the entire context in which the instructions were given expressly
informed the jury that it could consider mitigating evidence.""' The major-
ity pointed to two factors as evidence of the correcting context. The first
was the fact that there were two days of mitigating evidence presentation.
The second factor was the nature of the arguments put forward to the jury
by both defense counsel and the prosecutor regarding the mitigating evi-
dence."
The majority's use of the context doctrine here raises two questions.
First, the Boyde Court, unlike the Buchanan Court, correctly stated the
context doctrine, derived from Boyd v. United States,29 as follows: "a single
instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be
24. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 760 n.1 (quoting app. at 73).
25. Id. at 762 n.4.
26. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
27. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 762.
28. Id.
29. 271 U.S. 104 (1926).
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viewed in the context of the overall charge."3" Thus under Boyd, only other
instructions can give contextual meaning to an instruction. The majority's
attempted use of evidence presented and arguments made as context for the
instruction is simply not within the Boyd context rule.
Second, the idea that arguments of counsel are an appropriate place for
the jury to look in comprehending jury instructions is unusual at best.
Though juror knowledge of the legal system may be limited, the average
juror is aware that counsel on both sides are partisan. Most likely, jurors
take the arguments of counsel with a grain, if not a handful, of salt. But the
reverse is true for judges. The average juror correctly perceives the judge's
role to be that of disinterested third party, whose only motivation is justice.
This argument is mirrored in Justice Breyer's dissent, which cited to Taylor
v. Kentucky" for the notion that "[t]he jury will look to the judge, not to
counsel, for authoritative direction about what it is to do with the evidence
that it hears."32
In stating that the instruction was by itself sufficient to inform the
sentencing jury, the majority explained that in the selection phase, the
sentencer "may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to
consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." 3  However,
state law may "shape and structure the jury's consideration of mitigation so
long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant
mitigating evidence."34
In reaching its conclusion, the majority applied the standard for analyz-
ing jury instructions utilized by the Court in Boyde: "whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in
a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence."35 It is interesting to note that the Boyde Court cited to five
different standards found in Court precedent for analyzing jury instructions
in addition to the one applied in Boyde, and did not explicitly rule out
further use of any of them.36 An argument can be made that the Boyde
Court utilized the wrong standard and therefore that the Buchanan majority
did so as well. The Boyde standard asks whether there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that "the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." In
contrast, four of the five standards listed by the Boyde Court ask roughly the
30. Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926).
31. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
32. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1978).
33. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 317-18; Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
34. Id. (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 362 (1993); Penry, 492 U.S. at 326;
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988)).
35. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
36. Id. at 378-80.
37. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
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same question: whether reasonable jurors could have understood or misunder-
stood the instruction.38 The difference is small in wording but large in
meaning. The Boyde standard asks the reviewing court to speculate on the
undisclosed thought processes of the jurors. There is no dependable method
for finding out whether a juror applied an instruction in a manner which
prevented that juror's consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.
Assuming good faith on the part of jurors (as the system does, and in fact
must do), even directly asking a juror could not produce an accurate answer
to this inquiry. "Juror number one. Did you apply instruction X in a way
which prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence?"
Even if juror number one had done so, again assuming good faith, that juror
would not know that he had.
In contrast, the majority of the standards listed in Boyde inquire into
the understanding of the "reasonable juror." Reasonable conduct is a topic
with which courts are intimately familiar, and this familiarity would allow
a reviewing court to make a more informed judgment as to the effect of a
particular instruction.
In any case, the Buchanan majority found that the instruction did not
violate the Boyde standard. The majority found that it "afforded jurors an
opportunity to consider mitigating evidence"39 when it referred to "all the
evidence" in paragraph three.4" This is a curious conclusion in light of the
fact that no mention or description of mitigating circumstances appears at
all in the instruction. This is in contrast to paragraph two, which describes
the aggravating circumstance in some detail: "his conduct in committing the
murders of [his family] was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery....
Applying a "reasonable juror" standard, there is a very good argument
to be made that the instruction given in Buchanan was vague to the point of
misleading the reasonable juror, defined here as a lay person, or if possessing
a legal background, possessing no familiarity with death penalty law. One
making this argument would be in good company, for it is precisely the
argument that Justice Breyer made in his dissent in Buchanan.
38. The Boyde Court listed the following inquiries as precedential: (1) what "a reason-
able juror could have understood the charge as meaning," Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
315-17 (1985); (2) "what a reasonable juror 'could' have done and what he 'would' have done,"
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1987); (3) "whether reasonable jurors 'could have'
drawn an impermissible interpretation from the trial court's instructions," Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1988); (4) whether there is a "substantial possibility that the jury may
have rested its verdict on the 'improper' ground," id. at 377; and (5) "how reasonable jurors
'would have' applied and understood the instructions," id. at 389 (White, J., concurring).
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 379.
39. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 762.
40. The entire instruction given by the trial court can be found supra note 6.
41. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 759 n.1.
1999] 229
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Paragraph one of the instruction very generally informed the jury of
its task in the penalty phase. Paragraph two described the requirement that
the state prove the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt. Justice Breyer asserted that the key problem language lay in para-
graph three, which read as follows:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding paragraph,
then you may fix the punishment of the Defendant at death or if you
believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment.42
A reasonable juror likely would interpret paragraph three as follows. "If
you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the requirements of the preceding paragraph, then you
may fix the punishment of the Defendant at death,"4 (i.e., if you find that
the murder was vile, then you can sentence the defendant to death). Or, "if
you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment,""(i.e.,
if find that the murder was not vile, then you have to sentence the defen-
dant to life). It is the stringing together of the two phrases using the con-
junction "or" that leads a reasonable juror to interpret the second phrase in
light of the meaning of the first. As Justice Breyer put it, "[w]ithout any
further explanation, the jury might well believe that whether death is, or is
not, 'justified' turns on the presence or absence of Paragraph two's aggravat-
ing circumstances of the crime-not upon the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence about his upbringing and other factors."45 This language effectively
removes mitigating evidence from consideration by the reasonable juror.
Would not a reasonable juror conclude that there was at the very least a
presumption that death should be the sentence if one of the aggravators is
found? Such an effect would squarely violate the time-tested dictate of
Eddings v. Oklahoma46 that "the sentencer may not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."" If even one juror inter-
prets the instruction to restrict her consideration of any information which




45. Id. at 764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
47. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978)).
48. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (holding that a case must be
remanded for sentencing if the sentencer fails to consider all mitigating evidence, regardless
[Vol. 11:2
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C. Juror Comprehension Data
The guidelines outlined in Boyde, Tuilaepa and Buchanan leave open to
further litigation several issues about the relationship of aggravating and
mitigating factors. They also highlight the need for defense counsel to
develop creative means of communicating mitigation evidence clearly and
understandably despite minimal constitutional requirements.
If the "reasonable juror" standard is the appropriate standard, then
research on juror comprehension is relevant to the inquiry. A survey of ten
scientific studies of jury instruction comprehension between the years of
1978 and 1989 indicated that "[j]urors do not understand a large portion of
the judicial instructions delivered to them even when they are pattern
instructions."
49
However, even better than studies of how the average person under-
stands such instructions would be systematic interviews with actual death
penalty trial jurors. Fortunately, such data has begun to be gathered in the
last decade, in the Capital Jury Project, an endeavor funded by the National
Science Foundation, aimed at gaining a greater understanding of the capital
jury experience. Though the massive project is yet to be completed in its
entirety, some individual states' interviews have been completed and ana-
lyzed. Indeed, the survey of Virginia capital jurors is not yet finished, but
the survey of neighboring North Carolina has been completed.
Obviously, Virginia's capital murder penalty phase instructions are not
identical to those of any other state, and thus the application of data from
its neighboring state will not be one hundred percent accurate for Virginia.
However, due to the dictates of the United States Supreme Court, the
overall structure of capital murder trials is similar from state to state, and the
same people, namely lawyers, write the pattern instructions in each state.
The likelihood is high that conclusions from other states are also applicable
in Virginia.
North Carolina law applicable to the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial is similar to Virginia law in material respects. Like Virginia,
there is a fixed list of aggravators which the jury may consider,"0 while
according to federal law, in all states there can be no limit on the mitigating
of whether the barrier to consideration is interposed by a statute, the sentencing court or an
evidentiary ruling). See also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1990); but cf.
Paige Barnes McThenia, Case Note, 11 Cap. Def. J. 385 (1999) (analyzing Williams v. Taylor,
163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, No. 98-8384, 1999 WL 148296 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1999)).
However, the Court has granted certiorari in Williams, in part to decide whether ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are to be judged in context of the effect on one juror, where
Virginia law provides for a life sentence if all jurors do not agree on death.
49. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 589, 591 (1997).
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1998). Seealso VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
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circumstances which the jury may consider."1 Also, both states require
proof of aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt," while proof of mitigating
factors only to the juror's satisfaction. 3 Finally, jurors must be unanimous
in their finding of any aggravating factor,' while a unanimity requirement
is forbidden in the jurors' consideration of mitigating factors.55
In the North Carolina segment of the Capital Jury Project, data was
gathered from interviews with eighty-three jurors who served in capital
trials in the state between 1990 and 1994.6 Juror comprehension levels in
the three critical areas described in the above paragraph were shockingly
low. Only 36% of the jurors understood that they were restricted to consid-
eration of only those aggravators which were mentioned by the judge.
Almost half believed they could consider any factor which they believed
"aggravated" the crime. Such a belief is clearly contrary to that which the
Buchanan majority described as "the need for channeling and limiting the
jury's discretion" in the eligibility phase." Only 59% were aware that they
could consider any evidence they desired as mitigating.
58
With respect to aggravating factors, juror understanding was fairly
good. Two-thirds knew that proof was required beyond a reasonable doubt
and three-quarters knew that juror unanimity was required in finding an
aggravator. 9 Of course, two-thirds and three-quarters comprehension on
the part of jurors would not seem to satisfy the Court's "deman[d] [for]
certainty that the jury's conclusions res[t] on proper grounds." 6 Compre-
hension was worse regarding mitigating factors. Forty-one percent of jurors
believed that mitigating circumstances required proof beyond a reasonable
51. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1998). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
53. See N.C.P.I.-CRIM. S 150.10, at 27. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 15A-2000 (1998). See also VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(D)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
55. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988). The one major difference between
the North Carolina and Virginia statutory schemes is that the former is a "weighing" state,
while the latter is not. North Carolina law requires the sentencer to state whether "the
mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances found." N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(c)(3) (1997). The
Virginia Code instructs that if the jury finds either the "future dangerous" aggravator or the
"vileness" aggravator, it is free to impose either death or life imprisonment without parole
upon the defendant, without any specific "weight" analysis. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4
(Michie 1998). There is no obvious reason why this difference would have any effect upon
the valid application of the Capital Juror Project data to Virginia.
56. James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions:
Guided or Misguided? 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1161 (1995) [hereinafter "Luginbuhl & Howe"].
57. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 761 (1998).
58. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 56, at 1167.
59. Id.
60. Mills, 486 U.S. at 376.
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doubt while 42% believed that juror unanimity was required to find a
mitigating factor.6'
Commentators have speculated that one of the reasons juror compre-
hension of key legal points is so low is that capital instructions "typically use
complex language, unfamiliar words, one-sentence definitions of terms, and
many sentences with multiple negatives."62 Interviewees commented that
capital jury instructions "are full of legal talk," and "they are very long and
complicated.""
D. Recommendations
In May 1998, the Model Jury Instructions Committee for Virginia
published Virginia Model Jury Instruction 33.125 ("VMJI 33.125")," a new
version of its model penalty phase jury instruction. The instruction is the
successor to the instruction given in Buchanan.65 The only substantive
difference between the Buchanan instruction and the new VMJI 33.125 that
is relevant to this discussion is the addition of four words: "including
evidence in mitigation." What would be paragraph three in the Buchanan
instruction now appears as follows:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved that
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may fix the punish-
ment of the Defendant at death. But if you nevertheless believe from all
the evidence, including evidence in mitigation, that the death penalty is
not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at: [life
imprisonment]."
The additional language is certainly a step in the right direction, and
can be viewed as an implicit acknowledgment of the misleading nature of
the Buchanan instruction. However, there are two reasons why this new
version of the instruction may not be enough to insure proper jury under-
standing of its role. First, it may simply be ignored by trial courts. In
Buchanan, decided in January 1998, which according to one commentator
was after the Model Jury Instructions Committee decided to issue the new
model instruction, the Court approved of the Buchanan penalty phase
instruction, describing it as "a simple decisional tree."67 With the United
61. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 56, at 1167.
62. Id. at 1169.
63. Id. Interestingly, commentators have observed that the documented instructional
ambiguity in North Carolina's instructions "increases the likelihood of the jury returning a
verdict of death." Id. at 1176. There is no obvious reason to believe that instructional
ambiguities in Virginia's instructions have any different effect.
64. VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, No. 33.125 (1998).
65. See supra note 6.
66. VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, No. 33.125 (1998) (emphasis
added).
67. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 762 n.4 (1998).
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States Supreme Court's stamp of approval of the "old" instruction, it is
questionable whether Virginia trial judges, always sensitive to reversal, will
opt to begin using VMJI 33.125, the "new" instruction.
Second, bearing in mind that the data collected by the Capital Jury
Project and the conclusions of commentators, adding properly instructive
language after misleading language is not the optimal solution. Why not
simply replace VMJI 33.125 with an instruction that is comprehensible to
the lay reader?6" According to Virginia statutory law, "[a] proposed jury
instruction submitted by a party, which constitutes an accurate statement
of the law applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from the jury solely
for its nonconformance with model jury instructions."69 A proposed
instruction follows:
Capital Murder-Bifurcated Penalty Trial
Introduction
You have convicted the Defendant of a crime which can be punished by
the death penalty. Your job is to decide whether to sentence the defen-
dant to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Step 1
Did the Commonwealth prove to all the jurors that beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to his victims7' (and/or that it is probable that the
Defendant would commit criminal acts of violence in the future, consti-
tuting a continuing serious threat to society)? If no, then the Defendant
must be sentenced to life imprisonment. If yes, go to Step 2.
Step 2
Each juror must, individually, decide if there are any facts or circum-
stances which make that juror believe that life imprisonment is the more
appropriate punishment for the Defendant. For instance, a juror might
68. In a telling move, the majority itself, in an attempt to justify the language of the
Buchanan instruction, translated it into the following simpler language:
The instruction represents a simple decisional tree. The second para-
graph states that the Commonwealth must prove the aggravator beyond
a reasonable doubt. The third and fourth paragraphs give the jury alter-
native tasks according to whether the Commonwealth succeeds or fails
in meeting its burden. The third paragraph states that "if" the aggravator
is proved, the jury may choose between death and life. The fourth
paragraph states that 'f" the aggravator is not proved, the jury must
impose life.
Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 762, n.4. The reader should be mindful of the fact that the vast
majority of readers of Supreme Court opinions are attorneys, skilled in parsing language. Yet
even for this audience, the majority feels it must simplify the language of the instruction in
order to effectively communicate the instruction's comprehensibility to lay readers.
69. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-263.2 (Michie 1995).
70. The meaning of this aggravator requires further definition. See infra notes 74-89
and accompanying text. It is suggested herein that the effort to clarify the definition of the
.vileness" aggravator be made in a separate, additional instruction. This section of the article
is concerned with whether jurors correctly understand the decisional process.
[Vol. 11:2
RECONSIDERING BUCHANAN V. ANGELONE
consider any role the victim played in his own demise, the nature of the
Defendant's childhood, any mental or emotional problems the Defen-
dant might have, or any other information the juror thinks is important
to the decision. [Here, defense counsel should tailor the requested in-
struction to the particular mitigating facts in the case.)
Step 3
Each juror must, individually, decide from all the facts and circumstances
whether or not to sentence the Defendant to death or to life imprison-
ment. In order for the Defendant to receive the death penalty, all the
jurors must agree that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment
for this Defendant.
In the event a trial judge refuses to employ the above instruction, there
is a more minor modification to the traditional instruction that might be
accepted. Paragraph three of the Buchanan instruction, and the similar
paragraph in VMJI 33.125, states roughly the same language:
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the [existence of one or both aggravators],
then you may fix the punishment of the Defendant at death or if you
believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life imprisonment."
The use of the word "justified" is problematic. A reasonable juror would
find that the first if-then statement instructs that a death sentence is "justi-
fied" when the Commonwealth proves one or both aggravators by a reason-
able doubt. This juror would likely find the second if-then statement
redundant, because she has already decided whether a death sentence is
justified in addressing the first statement. The second statement could be
more effective if the word "appropriate" is used instead. This would give it
meaning independent of the first statement, requiring the juror to decide
whether the justified action is, in light of all the evidence, actually appropri-
ate.
IlL Invalid Aggravators
A careful reading of Buchanan also lends support to an issue familiar to
readers of the Capital DefenseJournal, the invalidity of the vileness aggrava-
tor through vagueness and the issue's applicability in cases where the Com-
monwealth seeks the death penalty under both statutory aggravators.
In one of the 1976 decisions in which the Court reinstated the death
penalty, the Court stated that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be' taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
71. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 760, n.1 (quoting app. at 73) (emphasis added).
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action. " " Further, the state "must channel the sentencer's discretion by
clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and
that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death."73 The Court made clear that this narrowing guidance must occur in
the eligibility phase, the phase in which various aggravators must be proven
by the state.74
A. The Statutory Language of Virginia's Vileness Factor
is Insufficient on Its Face
Part C of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4 requires that in the penalty
phase, the Commonwealth must prove one or both of the Virginia statutory
aggravators, either future dangerousness or that the Defendant's "conduct
in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the victim."7 Virginia's vileness factor has never been addressed
by the Court. Nevertheless, the issue is controlled by Godfrey v. Georgia,76
where the Court declared unconstitutional a Georgia statutory aggravator
identical to Virginia's vileness factor. The Court stated that "there is noth-
ing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint
on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A person
of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."77
An unconstitutionally vague aggravator may be saved if a state limits
its construction in order to provide "meaningful guidance to the
sentencer."78 However, the Court has stated that these limiting instructions
may themselves be unconstitutionally vague.79 Of the three "types" of
vileness, torture, depravity of mind and aggravated battery, Virginia has
attempted to save only the latter two through limiting constructions. In
Smith v. Commonwealth,"0 the Virginia Supreme Court defined depravity of
mind as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation."'"
Needless to say, this definition communicates no more specific or narrow
meaning than the term it is meant to clarify. The Smith court's definition
of aggravated battery likewise fails to sufficiently narrow its meaning. The
72. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
73. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
74. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72; Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992).
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
76. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
77. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.
78. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990).
79. Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990).
80. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
81. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
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court stated that aggravated battery in this context means conduct which is
"qualitatively and quantitatively . . . more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder."82 One can easily imagine a fact
pattern involving the minimum necessary to commit murder: one bullet to
the head, killing instantly, fired from a concealed position, giving the victim
no prior apprehension of danger. Thus construed, anything more than that
would be aggravated battery and thus vile, indicating that the factor does not
meaningfully narrow the class of defendants. Therefore, Virginia's vileness
factor, as construed, remains unconstitutionally vague. 3
B. Virginia's Vileness Factor is Unconstitutional as Applied
An examination of three recent Virginia Supreme Court cases demon-
strates that, as applied, the vileness factor is unconstitutionally vague. In
Reid v. Commonwealth,4 a case wherein the defendant stabbed the victim
twenty-two times, the court focused specifically on the act of killing, stating
that "[t]he number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is the
essence of the test whether the defendant's conduct was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated
battery."85 In Hedrick v. Commonwealth,86 the court looked beyond the act
of killing in order to affirm a death sentence based upon the vileness factor.
The court looked beyond the fact that the killing occurred through a single
gunshot to the head, and found the torture prong of vileness because of the
rape which preceded the killing. 7 Finally, the court in Cherrix v. Common-
wealth88 affirmed a death sentence based upon the vileness/depravity of
mind factor by consideration of events which occurred after the killing
incident was entirely over. Clearly, the Virginia vileness factor serves no
meaningful narrowing function with respect to the fact finder at trial or the
82. Id.
83. For a more in depth discussion of this issue, see the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house Trial Manual, pp. 203-29, available through the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse
at Washington & Lee University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia 24450.
84. 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998). For a more comprehensive discussion of Reid, see
Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid v. Common-
wealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
85. Reid, 506 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407,421 (Va.
1985)).
86. Nos. 982055, 982056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999). For a more comprehen-
sive discussion of Hedrick, see Kelly E. P. Bennett, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 429 (1999)
(analyzing Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 982055,982056,1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26,
1999)).
87. Hedrick, 1999 WL 101079, at *6.
88. Nos. 981798,982063, 1999 WL 101077 (Va. Feb. 26,1999). For a more comprehen-
sive discussion of Cherrix, see David D. Leshner, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 419 (1999)




Virginia Supreme Court in its reviewing capacity. Therefore, the factor is
unconstitutional as applied. 9 Though the United States Supreme Court has
up to this point refused to grant certiorari on this issue, defense counsel
would be well advised to continue to raise it, as persistence often pays
dividends. 9'
C. Sentences Based on A Sole Invalid Aggravator
The Godfrey Court went beyond its condemnation of the Georgia
vileness factor however, stating that "failure to instruct the sentencing jury
properly with respect to the aggravator does not automatically render a
defendant's sentence unconstitutional."9' Therefore, even if defense counsel
can convince a reviewing court that the trial court fact finder considered an
invalid aggravating factor, that consideration can be cured by appellate
review, assuming that the reviewing court itself applies a valid narrowing
construction of the aggravator. The Georgia Supreme Court failed this test
in Godfrey, and as mentioned above, an excellent argument can be made that
the Virginia Supreme Court's attempt at narrowing its vileness factor is also
insufficient under Shell v. Mississippi.92 The Court stated in Walton v.
Arizona93 that "[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it
in making their decisions. If the [state] Supreme Court has narrowed the
definition of the [vileness] aggravating circumstance, we presume that the
[state] trial judges are applying the narrower definition."94 Applying the
Court's reasoning, because the Virginia Supreme Court has not effectively
narrowed the vileness aggravator, we can assume that trial judges are not
validly instructing juries, and are not themselves applying a valid vileness
aggravator at the required judge-sentencing hearing.94
Therefore, in a death penalty case based solely on the vileness aggrava-
tor, which has reached a federal court through the review process, defense
counsel may properly petition that federal court to remand the case to state
court for (1) proper construction of the aggravator, or (2) a new sentencing
89. Although this analysis does not address the "future dangerousness" factor, it is the
position of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse that this factor too is unconstitutional
as applied. See Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP DEF. J. 373 (1999) (analyzing Sheppard v.
Taylor, 165 F.3d 19 (4th Cir. 1998)).
90. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
91. Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1526 (1997).
92. 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (stating that limiting instructions themselves may be unconstitu-
tionally vague).
93. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
94. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990).
95. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.5 requires that, after a jury imposes a sentence of
death on a defendant, the trial judge shall, after consideration of the presentence report,
decide whether or not to set aside the verdict. A judge may only do so "upon good cause
shown," meaning that the jury's decision is more than a recommendation. VA. CODE ANN.
S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
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hearing. In a case where the sentence was based upon both aggravators, the
situation is a bit more complicated.
D. Weighing Versus Non-weighing States
In Stringer v. Black,96 the Court held that in a weighing state,97 when
one of two or more aggravators found by the sentencer is later determined
to be invalid, "a reviewing court may not assume it would have made no
difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of the scale.""
The Court continued, stating that "[w]hen the weighing process itself has
been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at
the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received
an individualized sentence."" In Clemons v. Mississippi, "oo the Court, address-
ing the same issue, held that "[a]n automatic rule of affirmance in a weighing
State would be invalid undei Lockett v. Ohio . . . for it would not give
defendants the individualized treatment that would result from actual
reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circum-
stances.10
However, in Tugglev. Netherland,102 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia is a non-weighing state. In such a
state, "so long as the sentencing body finds at least one valid aggravating
factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not infect
the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty."
10 3
Despite Tuggle, there are facts which tend to show that Virginia is in
practice, and thus in reality, a weighing state. The jury instruction used in
Buchanan, discussed in the first part of this article, instructed the sentencer
to decide life or death based upon whether the juror "believe[s] from all the
evidence""' that the death penalty is justified. So, in the selection phase,
jurors are asked to look at "all the evidence," consisting of mitigators and
aggravators, and decide life or death. Taking a simple and common sense
approach, one might ask: How does a juror evaluate these mitigators against
these aggravators? Is there any method for doing so other than to compare
96. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
97. A "weighing state" is one in which the death penalty statute instructs the sentencer
to weigh the aggravators and mitigators in deciding the sentence. For example, in North
Carolina, the sentencer is instructed to state whether "the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found." N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(c)(3) (1997).
98. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992).
99. Id.
100. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
101. Clemons v. Miissssippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990).
102. 79 F.3d 1386, 1389 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 237 (1996).
103. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232.
104. Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S. Ct. 757, 760 n.1 (1998). For the full text of the
instruction, see supra note 6.
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them in the mind of the juror, or in other words, to weigh them against
each other? This common sense hunch is supported by social science: "In
everyday life, a common decision strategy is to weigh the pros and cons on
a particular issue and then to go with the greater weight of the evidence."'
This statement is made in the context of the assertion that when jurors do
not fully understand the intricacies of their instructions, they simply revert
to a time-tested method for decision making: weighing factors. It is asserted
here that when Virginia jurors are confronted with the confusing decision-
tree of the penalty phase instruction, they naturally utilize weighing as a
decision making technique.
Evidence that even the attorneys and judges think in terms of weighing
can be found in the Buchanan decision. Without comment of its own, the
Court, recounting the pertinent events of the trial, described the (Virginia)
prosecutor in the case as stating that "the jury.., would have to balance the
things in petitioner's favor against the crimes he had committed."0 6 Later
the Court states that the prosecutor said that "the jury had to weigh that
[mitigating] evidence against petitioner's conduct .. ."10 In fact, the Court
itself, in describing the context in which the jury instructions were given,
stated that the (Virginia) "parties in effect agreed that there was substantial
mitigating evidence and that the jury had to weigh that evidence against
petitioner's conduct in making a discretionary decision on the appropriate
penalty."'0 8
Further, the Court's assumed linkage in Zant v. Stephens"°n between
non-weighing states and specific jury findings of aggravators is flawed. In
fact, North Carolina and Florida, both weighing states, require such a
specific finding from the sentencer. North Carolina requires that the
foreman of the jury sign a writing which shows "the statutory aggravating
circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt.. ."" Florida requires the trial judge to support its determination of
sentence by "specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances
in subsection (5) and (6),"" where those subsections are lists of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, respectively.
In any event, whether or not Virginia is in fact a weighing state, there
can be no automatic salvage of death sentences by the Virginia Supreme
Court. As stated above,' the Stringer Court addressed non-weighing states
as well as weighing, holding that in the former states, "so long as the sen-
105. Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 56, at 1174.
106. Buchanan, 118 S. Ct. at 759 (emphasis added).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added).
109. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1997).
111. FL. STAT. S 921.141(3) (1998).
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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tencing body finds at least one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also
finds an invalid aggravating factor does not infect the formal process of
deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty."113 However, this state-
ment was qualified by the Court in the very next sentence of the opinion:
"Assuming a determination by the state appellate court that the invalid
factor would not have made a difference to the jury's determination, there
is no constitutional violation resulting from the introduction of the invalid
factor in an earlier stage of the proceedings."114 Therefore, even in a non-
weighing state, when a death sentence is based on more than one aggravator
and one aggravator is later found to be invalid, the sentence may not be
automatically salvaged, but must at least undergo harmless error review by
the state appellate court. In practical terms, harmless error review in the
Virginia Supreme Court may look very much like automatic salvage, but at
a minimum, this interpretation of Stringer requires the addition of one more
step to the process.
E. Recommendations
In addition to the barriers in Buchanan to sentencing jury comprehen-
sion of the proper place of mitigation, the problem is exacerbated by the
unconstitutional application of aggravators, especially the vileness factor.
It is essential that defense counsel continue to press the Virginia courts on
this issue, and equally important that counsel federalize the objections and
pursue them in federal courts.
It is clear from the foregoing arguments that Virginia is, in practice, a
weighing state. In recognition of that reality, in a case where one of two
aggravating factors found by a sentencer is later held to be invalid, the
proper course of action is remand to the Virginia Supreme Court for deter-
mination whether "the evidence supports the existence of the aggravating
circumstance as properly defined,""' or whether, eliminating consideration
of the invalid factor altogether, the remaining aggravating circumstance is
sufficient to warrant the death penalty. 116 In this way, the Virginia Supreme
113. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653-54 (1990) (emphasis added).
116. A further consequence of recognizing that Virginia is in reality a weighing state is
the application of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), to the state. Espinosa held that
in a weighing state where sentencing authority is placed in two actors rather than one, neither
actor may be permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Id. at 1082. The Court
found that because Florida law requires the trial court to give "great weight" to the jury
recommendation, see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), that if the jury weighed
an invalid aggravator, the trial court must be presumed to have done so as well, at least
indirectly. Id.
Analogously, Virginia law states that the trial judge, in her post jury-sentence sentenc-
ing hearing, may impose a sentence different from the jury only "upon good cause shown."
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998). The statute's implicit urging of
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Court's habit of automatic salvage for death sentences under improper or
lacking limiting constructions will be curtailed. It is of course likely the
court will "save" the aggravator on remand, but this extra step will, if
nothing else, slow the process. And finally, even if counsel is unable to
establish that the "weighing state" requirements of Stringer apply to Vir-
ginia, counsel may nevertheless legitimately insist that the Virginia Supreme
Court apply harmless error review, rather than automatic salvage.
IV Conclusion
Buchanan v. Angelone was, on the whole, a loser for Virginia capital
defendants. The Court affirmatively stated first that defendants are not
entitled to jury instructions on the subject of mitigation or on particular
mitigating factors, and second that Virginia's pattern penalty phase instruc-
tion, used in Buchanan's sentencing phase, was just fine. On the bright side,
however, it brought issues of instruction comprehension to the forefront,
possibly (and ironically) contributing to Virginia's new pattern instruction
which does at least mention the word mitigation. Defense counsel should
take advantage of recent social science evidence that jurors simply do not
understand the typical jury instruction, and push for more comprehensible
ones. Buchanan also involved the controversy over the invalidity of the
"vileness" aggravator, and the potential remedies available once counsel have
shown it to be so. Though the case seems, at first glance, without redeem-
ing value, it has provided defense counsel direction in two potentially
advantageous areas of law.
the trial judge to follow the jury recommendation is analogous to Florida's "great weight"
requirement. Thus, upon application of Espinosa to Virginia, if it is determined that the jury
weighed an invalid aggravator, it must be assumed that the trial judge did as well.
[Vol. 11:2
